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Like the world itself, the textual encounter permits infinite possibilities. But how does 
language contain the undisclosed? This question is internalised in the process of writing but it 
is also relevant to the spiritual quest. My detours as a writer, from silence to rhetoric 
comprise a journey that is difficult to describe but which is triggered by discontents of one or 
another cause, displacing me towards different ways of seeing. Sometimes the path has been 
to practise meditative silence, at other times it has compelled me to resist the silence of 
colonialism, to reclaim a culture and heritage lost to me but renegotiated within the tropes of 
rhetoric. I made several journeys to India to research the poems in my recent collection, 
Vishvarūpa. But what pitfalls does the poet face as ethnographer? How can myth and 
memory reconstruct a postcolonial identity? Writing is a space that emanates from silence. 
But it is also cultured and gendered, encoded by the positive terms of language and its 
philosophical assumptions. I would like to discuss these concerns within the framework of 
Buddhist and Hindu philosophy and with reference to Tyler’s discourses on postmodern 
ethnography and rhetoric. In much the same way as we consider culture or a literary tradition 
relative to the writing it produces, I think it is worthwhile to give consideration to detours, to 
the journeys of displacement, which are marked and re-marked by language though they 
occur outside of language. Such flights inscribe and renew a writer’s relationship to writing.  
 
The Semiotics of Meditation 
A journey needs maps and directions so I would like to begin by quoting a well-known Zen 
proverb: The finger that points to the moon is not the moon.  
 
This aphorism is typical of how Mahayana Buddhist logic is deconstructive in its negation 
and reversal of meaning (often, it expresses a double negation). In this analogy, the moon is 
enlightenment and the finger represents both the signifier and signified combined. The finger 
denotes both the word ‘enlightenment’ and all possible notions we may have about it. The 
assumption here is that by looking beyond all relative notions of enlightenment we may begin 
to experience it for ourselves. The phrase is image-like and rhetorical; in Barthes’ lexis it 
denotes a linguistic message while it also connotes the esoteric, the concurrence of oblivion 
within essence.  
 
I became deeply interested in Buddhism thirteen years ago. I was privileged to have a wise 
teacher, Venerable Pra Ajahn Po. At Wat Suan Mokkh, a forest monastery in Thailand 
founded by the well-known monk Buddhadhasa Biku, who was committed to social change 
and the teaching of Buddhist practice to Westerners, I learned what I describe as the 
semiotics of meditation. I travelled there because I needed to find space. Because, like most 
of us, I wished to be liberated from suffering. What I encountered in silence among the grass 
snakes and geckoes, was my petulance and frustration.  
 
There is an essential emptiness in the way that Buddha responded to the metaphysical 
questions of reality: questions such as the unity or the separation of the body and the mind, or 
questions about the afterlife. He suggested that reality is devoid of speculative or 
philosophical designations and therefore that language is a priori insufficient. Interwoven into 
the structure and quality of consciousness, language is a cultural phenomenon, based on 
arbitrary distinctions and differences, a systematic and organised use of symbols, which has 
semantic, logical, and expressive meaning. Ānāpānasati, also known as mindfulness of 
breathing, is a sixteen-step contemplation of body, feelings, mind, and dhamma. It comprises 
both śamatha (concentration) and vipassanā (insight). In this sutra the activity of the mind is 
diverted from the production of meaning towards the recognition and abandonment of 
signifiers. The mind is trained in non-identification with signifiers or signified, which are 
transitory and provisional, in particular the hindrances to mental harmony. 
 
The dhamma (a term which is interpreted in many ways by different schools) was described 
by Buddhadhassa Biku as ‘natural law’, being more like a science than a philosophy. It 
proposes there is nothing permanent or absolute within the mind. Rather, our minds are a part 
of nature. For me this realisation was profound. Given that I have always found solace in 
nature it should not have been surprising. The Buddha apprehended a reality that transcends 
the order of ‘worldly’ objects, in which things are perceived beyond affirmation or negation, 
independent of categories or conceptual thinking. The phenomenon of the real is like a 
flickering, empty of form, interconnecting, in a state of constant flux. Like most Westerners, 
and despite having a science background, my ego and logic resisted in particular the teaching 
of anatta or non-self. Anatta refers to objects and conditions, without exception and including 
nibbana (enlightenment), as non-being, non-self, lacking any essence or substance that could 
properly be regarded as a ‘self’. This premise does not deny the existence of things, but 
rejects as problematic the facile relationship between a phenomenal signifier and a theoretical 
signified. During śamatha meditation one observes the pixelation of senses, feeling, thinking, 
observing, and knowledge. Buddhism then, is an empirical practice of non-materiality, 
aligned to post-structuralist theory. It predicts Derrida’s critique of Western metaphysics, 
with its implication that: 
 
There has to be a transcendental signified for the difference between signifier 
and signified to be somewhere absolute and irreducible. (Grammatology 12) 
 
Sceptical of metaphysics, the notion of a ‘transcendental signifier’ was hardly foremost in my 
mind when I travelled to Thailand. But Ajahn Po’s account of ‘non-self’ was perplexing, 
contesting all my university training. It was announced with clarity rather than with 
conviction. ‘Not me, not my’, he would utter slowly in reference to anatta, his thick southern 
Thai accent stripped of rhetoric in the quiet of morning after we had been meditating since 
well before dawn. This was a time when the colours of flowers seemed most vivid. When I 
opened my eyes, Pra Ajahn Po’s face had a wild and gentle appearance, much like a snake’s. 
How could it be that the self did not exist? From quantum physics I knew that atoms are the 
building blocks of matter yet at their core they are empty. I had read about anti-matter and the 
unspecified particles of dark matter, which emits no light and is invisible.  
During meditation silence is broken by mental constructions: the Lacanian other/Other 
already inhabits the self and has been encountered in both the imaginary and symbolic sense. 
Thoughts arise and decay. In such a space language is not static but fragmented, ephemeral; 
neither language nor thought can be held indefinitely. Only when the mind floats free of 
hindrances can it dwell in sublime ‘pure’ silence, beyond thought, beyond signification; a 
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foreignlanguage. To recuperate Foucault’s term, I describe this space as a heterotopia 
resisting a stable identity. Foucault tells us that: 
 
The heterotopia is capable of juxtaposing in a single real place several spaces, 
several sites that are in themselves incompatible. (25) 
 
Theravadan meditation acts as a counteraction to refigure the way the self is seen as 
fragmented, as anatta. Active and passive, it resonates outside of place or time, conditioned 
by impermanence, closed and private in one sense yet infinitely open to the mind’s gestures. 
So it is interesting that Buddhism predicts a deconstructionist notion of the Same, the Ideal, 
in its critique of realism and the logocentric production of meaning. 
 
Langue et Parole: La Voix Moyenne  
Language and Speech: The Middle Voice 
Over the course of some years I made several sojourns to Buddhist monasteries in 
Northeastern Thailand and in Laos. As a visitor I was asked not to speak, not to write, or 
read. The function of language in the sangha community is minimal, whereas in a literary 
community, language is a commodity, indulged, and accessorised. When I asked Pra Ajahn 
Po, what I should do on returning to my Western existence, he advised that I should practise 
meditation at least twice a day and not speak too much. When I asked about the status of 
writing, he said that I should abandon it because it is to do with the self; it is an attachment to 
the self. Certainly writing participates intensely in many thoughts, feelings, discernments, and 
categories of consciousness from which Buddhist practice tries to detach. For years this had 
perplexed me. While it seemed like a compromise I convinced myself that writing and 
meditation were parallel journeys. Yet given that a writer must detach from writing in order 
to liberate writing, I now consider that Pra Ajahn Po’s advice to me was correct. I have come 
to appreciate how the Buddhist perspective on any given concept is nuanced by a depth of 
field which reverses that concept. So within its own parameters any answer may contain its 
question, any presence, its absence, any self, its Other. 
 
Buddhism describes this coexistence of conditions of being and non-being as ‘the middle 
path’. As Jin Y. Park writes, quoting aptly from the Nirvāna Sūtra and other Pali texts:  
 
As the Buddha tries to explain to Kaccāyana, to say that there is no self is only 
another way of saying that there is self. … By putting the affirmation and 
negation in the same category Buddhist thought deviates from the dualistic 
discourse in which being and non-being, presence and absence, active and 
passive form binary opposites. (10) 
 
Derrida critiques the many discourses in which dualisms underlie the metaphysics of essence 
and presence, in privileging speech (parole) over written language (langue). Writing he 
asserts is already inscribed in speech as absence is in presence. Derrida’s ‘middle voice’ is 
not a dialectic, rather the collapse of opposites. A simultaneous operation of neither word nor 
concept, it marks a juncture, an epoch. Différance is the detour from the univocal, the trace of 
delay and interplay. It could be described as inter-being, as meaning’s double desire, its 
stenography and its scars, the scribbled disavowal of memory, the scriptures of articulation. 
Park quotes Derrida’s account: 
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 différance is neither simply active, nor simply passive, that it announces or 
rather recalls something like the middle voice, that is speaks of an operation 
which is not an operation, which cannot be thought of either as a passion or as 
an action of a subject upon an object … or on the basis of, or in the view of, any 
of these terms … (Derrida quoted in Park 12) 
 
Buddhism and deconstructionism both rely on practise, returning to the breath or the circuitry 
of the text. The middle path of Buddhism may even resonate with the middle voice. I wrote a 
sequence of poems in my first collection which are a homage to the journeys I made to 
Theravadan monasteries. They gesture towards touching the void somewhere between 
knowledge and wisdom, which summoned my curiosity and seemed necessary to trace. Such 
experience oscillates between words and the realm of silence. So even a description of the 
desire to be free from desire, is desire. Here is the poem ‘Dukkha’. 
 
Dukkha2  
 
Does it surprise you 
to be torn by this dialogue? 
To feel the ribbon of your breath  
trip, your joints burn? 
In the jungle you sweat, 
stumbling step by step,  
swearing blindly that this 
was not what you expected … 
 
how your logical bones defend a corpse. 
 
Grass swallows the monk 
walking through a coconut grove.  
Burnt saffron, the sun steals his robes.  
Without want you see 
tree snakes coil over leaves, 
toward the gully. 
Sometimes the walls  
percuss with geckoes,  
each gift, a birth. 
Ease for the shock of knowing  
your life’s making and going. 
At dawn you bathe by a well 
naked of words or laughter. 
Thoughts retreat like colours 
in the untarnished light.  
 
(The Accidental Cage 48) 
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The poem contains images which some might describe as exotic, such as the appearance of a 
tree snake in the absence of name or category. The second person voice is personal, self-
inquiring in tone. The poem describes an alternative cultural and philosophical experience 
and it hints in the final lines at the process of meditation where thoughts retreat. The study of 
experience, phenomenology and the way it is structured consciously intrigued me as a writer. 
And while the poem is not free from this reality, it partially fulfils its lyric promise of image, 
narrative, voice. My interest in the tension between inner and outer worlds led me to witness 
themes of entrapment and liberation as they reflect the four noble truths of Buddhist 
philosophy. We are seduced by thought and mental constructs; we suffer because of 
attachment to identity but the mind is subject to natural processes: birth, decay, and 
impermanence.  
 
Years later I still have a beginner’s mind and do not wish to suggest myself as an expert or 
scholar. There are many forms of Buddhism: broadly speaking Theravada and Mahayana, 
which includes the esoteric traditions of Zen, Tibetan, and Tendai. Extant discourse on the 
intersections between Buddhism and deconstructionism has been marginalised though 
budding at the interface of philosophy, theology, Asian studies, and postmodernism. It often 
extends to a comparative analysis of Buddhism and deconstructionism’s negative theology 
which I am not trying to establish. Critics and academics like Jin Y. Park, Robert Magliola, 
Fabio Rambelli have focused on Mahayana Buddhism which is founded on the writings of 
the sage, Nâgârjuna. A 2nd century South Indian philosopher, Nâgârjuna’s engagement with 
emptiness is readily analogous to Derrida’s theory of trace and erasure. His tetralemmic logic 
questions the subject/predicate relationship as a way of dismantling theories of identity and 
dhamma.  
 
However, my encounters with Theravada Buddhism establish it, for myself, as a thoroughly 
semiotic and empirical practice which closely observes Pali text, and in which the function of 
meditation is performative, deconstructing received concepts. Ānāpānasati does not merely 
observe language in a highly systematic manner, but it questions the status of knowledge and 
the authority of signs.  
 
Two Kinds of Silence 
For the postcolonial purpose, concerned with reviving a material identity in a predominantly 
homogenised literary discourse, Buddhism’s tropes of silence appear at first glance to be 
problematic. But in rejecting the coherence of signification to an original, unified self, 
Buddhism contests the logocentrisms and ethnocentrisms of dominant Western discourse 
with its silencing of Others. The Buddha anticipated a critique of Platonic intolerance to a 
blend or mélange of heterogeneous terms. My growing awareness of the nature of hybridity 
has become an intuitive aspect of my work, writing from the perspective of difference where 
the notion of identity becomes problematic and fractured.  
 
Contextualised by a historico-political climate of white neo-colonialism and racial supremacy 
my activism has merged with writing. Yet writing from the interstices towards the middle 
voice is a practice which helixes along what is quite possibly the same axis as a spiritual path. 
There are many nuances to consider in the way language might cross its violent edges and 
boundaries. Five years ago these detours found me researching the Upanishads of Hindusim 
from which I had been deracinated as a postcolonial subject.  
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In the Vedic tradition there appears to be a tacit acceptance of an ultimate reality. Non-duality 
implies that there is no separation between the soul and the Brahman. Yet the distinctions 
between self and other, between mind and body, between active and passive are apparent 
within Hinduism’s varied communities. Nâgârjuna raised serious doubts about non-duality in 
250 AD by pointing out the emptiness of selfhood, and the paradoxical nature of acquiring 
knowledge.  
 
Non-duality has had its rough ride over the centuries but it poses intriguing questions. In what 
state of awareness is the experiential world real or illusory? Dream, waking, sleep, or the 
fourth state, described as ‘pure’ consciouness? This had been the subject of syllogistic 
analysis amongst Vedanta scholars, particularly Gaudapada (8th century Advaita) and 
Ramanuja (10th century). The poems I wrote in Vishvarūpa are structurally connected by 
slippages between dream, memory, waking, and myth as non-linear events. Readers who are 
expecting to find a temporal or logical order to the poems might miss the crossing over fault 
lines. The diasporic consciousness resides in more than one locus or time; it moves in a 
reverse and a forward direction, both enabled and troubled by what Salman Rushdie describes 
as ‘stereoscopic vision’ (19).  
 
Hierarchies of event and place, of real and mythic, of coloniser and colonised can be 
transformed by liminality. In my story ‘The Lucid Krishna’ a Newtown-based psychoanalyst 
has a dream about befriending a vegetarian saxophonist, called Krishna. During the course of 
the dream, the psychoanalyst begins to exercise her own purpose thereupon empowering the 
god-like musician. From a volatile, heterotopic space I have written a bildungsroman about 
an Indian girl of mixed ancestry who migrates to Australia. I have come to appreciate the 
complementary merits of the Buddhist and Vedic spiritual disciplines, inspired by the 
syncretism apparent in the Himalayas (Nepal, India) and in Bali, with its Hindu and Buddhist 
avatars.  
 
An influential text for me has been Christopher Isherwood’s translation of the Bhagavad 
Gīta, in which Krishna counsels Arjuna, preparing him to take a difficult action to slay his 
cousins on the battlefields of Kurukshetra. Krishna advises Arjuna of a middle path: that 
there are two paths towards realisation, the path of action and the path of contemplation. But 
Krishna’s two paths if pursued to the end will ultimately intersect, leading to one place. This 
delayed transcendence appears to be reinstating an undivided Self. So the resemblances 
between Vedanta Hinduism, Buddhism, and deconstructionism are partial. 
 
While I question the idea of ‘an ultimate reality’ or the undivided subject of ethnocentric 
representations, what interests me in Hinduism is how the silence of the subject may be 
broken by rhetoric, destabilised by liminality, de-historicised by myth. The poem ‘Two 
Souls’ is an example of the frisson between non-duality and non-self (anatta): 
 
Two Souls 
 
My cat cries when I enter the garden, as  
if I have aroused her from winter’s dream, 
or as if she wants to sing to me, her name. 
 
What do cats dream of Lord Krishna? 
A coconut shell of milk, or a glittering fish? 
Now her slender limbs complete their asanas. 
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Now her neck arches, her jaw, an elastic. 
The sharp eye constricts, discerns wind 
in the quivering grass from a grass-hopper’s 
 
camouflage. But there’s no mistaking Maya. 
My cat rehearses the accurate lunge of her paw. 
She cries, as one compelled; hungry, yet not. 
 
Perhaps my being here, deserves an answer.  
For weeks, I too, have watched her, how 
she hunts. I’ve heard the moan of her catch  
 
at dusk, which is your hour, Lord Krishna. 
Then, no bird sings and only a cat with two souls  
dreams of death, her stigma left on a lizard, 
 
or on a butterfly, whatever moves towards 
the shadow of meaning. As I am born of fire,  
I burn, my Lord, but I sleep in your arms. 
 
I am one Upanishad moon, on fragrant nights. 
By day I am the consort of oceans, rice fields, 
pale and invisible to you as the sky’s temple. 
 
(Vishvarūpa 81) 
 
At surface the poem hints at Hinduism’s polytheistic monotheism which departs from 
Buddhism’s non-theism in preserving a transcendental signifier. Yet meaning in the poem is 
destabilised by perceptual ambiguities of image and time (the quivering grass mistaken for an 
insect, the cat’s moan, a memory) and the speaker is variously mutable as consort, temple, 
symbolised by fire, moon, or sleep. Non-dualism is an aporia where self and non-self are 
realised as mutually interdependent but unified in the ‘ultimate’ state of reality. 
 
So regarding identity the central question for Vedanta Hindusim is not unlike the question 
that nations face: namely what is Brahman and what is the nature of the relationship between 
the multiplicities of its individuals to this ultimate reality? Hindu mythology is replete with 
visceral, karmic, erotic, and homoerotic narratives. An outside observer will notice the 
interchangeability of its avatars, its double gender incarnations, as in the ardhanārīśhvara 
which transexualise the identities of Śiva and Pārvatī.  
 
The Intrusion of Rhetoric 
 
One celebrated interlocutor was Welsh-born lawyer and Sanskrit translator William Jones. In 
1784, soon after his arrival in India, he wrote a seminal essay ‘On the Gods of Greece, Italy 
and India’ in which he draws analogies between Hindu and European mythological deities. 
His thesis of common origins endorses the rational superiority of European culture vis-à-vis 
the primitivism of Hinduism’s polytheistic worship which is stereotyped as imaginative and 
feminine. Jones also wrote hymns to Hindu deities which brazenly legitimise colonial rule, 
economic and legal exploitation (for further detail I direct readers to Sugirtharajah’s 
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research). Orientalist writing inscribes an ethnographic mapping of Asia as marginal and 
inferior. As Edward Said has brilliantly reasoned it was highly complicit in textualising 
empire. 
 
A staging of postcolonial interventions in the rhetorical canon has been revived by critics like 
Gayatri Spivak and Homi Bhabha, whose work straddles both theory and politics. Similar 
strategies are apparent in my recent book. In particular these poems ply an aesthetics of 
paradox, transition, and ambivalence. They free play with hybridity, graftings, translations, or 
they focus on absence. Counteracting sexist identifications I take a feminist slant on the 
androgene configuration of deities in my poems about Kālī, or in ‘Durgā: A Self Portrait’, 
which deconstructs the myth of the beautiful warrior, the femme fatale, for whom 
comparisons are drawn to Phoolan Devi, the Dalit Queen, and Buffy the Vampire Slayer. 
 
Today I am androgynous, engineered as a split sex. I copy 
Shiva’s face, Vishnu’s arms and Rama’s hair. Light congeals 
with strength in my bones to mend a crisis the male gods fail. 
 
I memorize Mahisura’s praise: You are too beautiful for anything  
but love, he declares, too delicate to fight. Half an hour later, after 
he morphs from a buffalo to an elephant, a lion to a man, 
 
I castrate him with a graceful blow. My suitors surrender to this 
transcendental play. As for Vishnu I spin him right round, like a record.  
Men desire me for the fruit of knowledge. Want no handmaiden,  
 
yet still a second sex; the sum of my parts being multiples of one.  
My instruments, my weaponry and my props are channelled 
from sensitive New Age gods, with their fondness for repetition.  
 
(Vishvarūpa 58) 
The poem works by soliloquising Durgā’s cognitions and perceptions; making of them a 
discursive object, a self-revealing instrument. The monological voice of the observer 
becomes sceptical, and is in two minds, aware of her potential to exceed the power of men, 
whilst acknowleding her limitations. My poem is not directly inspired by the 
ardhanārīśhvara myth, which Indian feminists have critiqued for a binary which subsumes 
the female aspect, Pārvatī, into the male aspect of īśvara, or Lord. The right half of the body 
assigned to the male god is culturally privileged, being the seat of the intellect, and 
traditionally the wife sits to the left of her husband in what is known as vamangi. So the 
apparent equality of ardhanārīśhvara is misleading, if taken out of cultural context. 
The Poet as Ethnographer 
This raises the issue of the poet’s role as ethnographer, observing the Other with an 
inescapable cultural bias. Ethnography is an accountable discipline existing between 
contested representations at the interface of cultures, classes, races, and gender. The poet 
ethnographer exercises her discourse with paired speech, with double vision, travelling as 
both participant and observer. My insider/outsider perspective absorbed encountered texts 
and experiences through the filter of literary craft, to produce a piece of writing which creates 
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the illusion of a coherent whole and in which the poetic and political seeminseparable. 
Transliterations, historical notes, and commentary relativise the text so that a space is created 
for an external staging, a play of references. But there are subtle distinctions between 
historical precision, objectivity, and the dangers of a univocal allegorising identity. Without 
the instrument of rhetoric destabilising the presence of self in writing there is a tendency to 
exoticise the Other by what Tyler describes as an inescapable ‘occultation of the native’ 
(101).  
The emergence of rhetoric as an instrument of communication and dialogue contests mimetic 
writing. Rhetoric in the contemporary sense is aligned to a culture of oral discourse and 
transportable type, where the writing process becomes an instrument of thought and reason. 
Susan Jarratt has aruged that ‘hagiographic discourse contains the beginnings of a rhetorical 
consciousness’ (35). I think that I intuitively developed this in my work in the portrait poems 
and persona poems, the dramatic monologues of the devas and mahadevas. These poems do 
not necessarily dramatise true or false selves but intersect fictional elements with historical 
and biographical shavings to construct a space of counteraction to memory, myth, history, 
and its errata, a playful hybridity of polphonic voice. They shift in tone, ranging from 
humourous to sceptical or devotional forms of texual enactment where identity can be 
revised. 
In ‘Sita’ references are made to the cross-dressing myth of Krishna-Mohini, which South 
Indian transsexuals identify with. Aravanis are the transgender brides of god who take on the 
persona of Krishna-Mohini. Implicit in my poem is an empathy that the economically 
privileged First World child observer feels towards the low caste, disempowered but 
mythically formidable hijra. Her body becomes a site, which questions how cultural codes 
and conventions sex the body into binaries of power and powerlessness. 
  
The physicality of words themselves encodes difference. Despite limitations of typography 
and my concerns about the legitimacy of romanising translations of a language I could not 
read, let alone speak, the title of Vishvarūpa speaks over the coloniser’s voice. Tyler 
evaluates the tropes of ethnography and translation. He claims that both practices are 
motivated by a desire to dominate difference ‘by means of identities or equivalences which 
make native life fit the civilised contours of our own discourse, make it palatable to our 
spacience and amenable to our interests’ (96). I might be criticised for this but in my defence 
I am not writing from the perspective of white male colonial privilege. The textual 
simplification had I chosen not to use diacritics would have erased all cursive and phonetic 
trace of Sanskrit. The incompletions that compromise a correct transliteration of the Sanskrit 
words in Vishvarūpa are arguably a form of ambivalence which strategically locates the 
exotic within a local (Anglophone) context. They underline the imperceptible difference 
between grapheme and phoneme, marking a trace of what is absent, inaudible, and invisible. 
 
If we think of poetry as a space whose boundaries are exclusively linguistic, as Simon West 
proposes in a recent essay on translation, we avoid the recognition of cultural and gendered 
spaces which have been occupied by language. The coloniser relies on connections between 
language, economic progress, and social status. These elements are mutually interdependent 
in the practice of domination by one culture over another. West positions translation within a 
colonial context which establishes Eurocentric and Anglophone hierarchies:  
 
Perhaps we are so used to considering Australian poetry within or in relation to 
Anglo-Celtic and US literary spaces (the spaces of English-language poetry) that 
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it has been easy to overlook foreign-language influences, particularly those of 
Europe. (54) 
 
While I welcome his exegesis on contemporary translation, its description of the ‘variously 
international’ (54) is typical of Australian perspectives which absent Asia almost entirely. 
West acknowledges the complexity of cultural considerations; he acknowledges translations 
as ‘imperfect artefacts’ (57) but his focus is on the aesthetic ideal as a territory of translation. 
This separation of culture from language is one way the poet as ethnographer accomplishes a 
transition to the symbolic. Language is not pure abstraction; nor is it hermetically sealed. 
Both medium and instrument; it structures culture and gender. Cultural and linguistic 
alienation locates in the body and its memory a habitation, a discourse negotiated in 
language, a space that is fragmented and incomplete, present in absence. Language variance 
can be metonymic of difference, both cultural and sexual, shifting the poem from mimesis to 
rhetoric. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Perhaps my writing has shifted from a phenomenological consciousness to a rhetorical one, 
prompted by displacements of language, inspired by the fragmentation and multiplicity in 
Buddhist and Hindu discourses. Like deconstructions these teachings describe the inherent 
suffering, the ‘double bind’ arising from desire, which always drifts beyond the present 
experience in search of fulfilment or disclosure. Sociologically, the Upanishads differed from 
Buddhist texts having been handed down within a hierarchical order, which prevented the 
spread of its ideals to the ordinary people. (This aspect of Hinduism was critiqued in the 19th 
century by Swami Vivekananda.)  
 
Like the Buddha, who wandered with his monks through the villages and townships of 
northern India in the 4th century BC, I feel in exile from the life which chose and which 
sustains me. Having less time to practise meditation I drift into the unwritten, writing to and 
from a middle voice. Pankaj Mishra in his memoir, An End To Suffering, describes the 
Buddha as being a social reformer as well as an enlightened being. The Buddha’s path to 
liberation is inclusive of all castes, all living beings, be they brahmins or sudras; or be they 
outcasts, what the Portuguese might call desterrados, what Gayatri Spivak describes as the 
subaltern.  
 
This is what compels me, this hybridity, which is rich and inventive. When we use language 
we invest it with meaning, with reasoning, invariably adopting an epistemological stance. But 
it is worthwhile to consider the detours, the junctures into which a writing voice collapses. 
Such a voice absorbs all the ambivalence, insecurities, and isolation of the imaginary life. It 
transforms that imaginary life into something tangible. A self on the point of becoming 
something else is performative, uncertain of its movement or its representation. The textual 
encounter permits for me a fantasy of identities, riven by migration, linguistic exile, 
economic and cultural subordination. Yet however symbolic the dominant language might 
appear, its semantics and its logos are a construction like the pages of a book that is falling 
apart even as we read it. 
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